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Squatters, Pirates, and Entrepreneurs:
Is Informality the Solution to the
Urban Housing Crisis?
Carmen G. Gonzalez*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Giving the poor legal title to the lands they occupy extralegally (informally) has been widely promoted by the World Bank
and by best-selling author Hernando de Soto as a means of
addressing both poverty and the scarcity of affordable housing in
the urban centers of the global South.' Using Bogota, Colombia,
as a case study, this article interrogates de Soto's claims about the
causes of informality and the benefits of formal title.
The article concludes that de Soto's analysis is problematic in
three distinct respects. First, de Soto exaggerates the benefits of
formal title and fails to consider its risks. Second, de Soto constructs informality as a uniquely Third World phenomenon, and
neglects to address the growth of poverty, inequality, and informality in both the global North and the global South as a consequence of the neoliberal economic reforms that de Soto advocates.
Third, de Soto's attribution of informality to the failure of law in
the global South reinforces the narrative of Latin American inferiority, thereby justifying the imposition of disadvantageous market-oriented legal reforms on Latin American nations and
discrediting Latin America legal innovations that might better
alleviate poverty and address the shortage of affordable housing.
Contrary to de Soto's policy prescriptions, the benefits of formality and informality must be evaluated on a case by case basis.
De Soto's ideas are dangerous to the extent that they persuade
policy-makers that the "free market" will solve the problem of pov* Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law. I would like to thank
Daniel Bonilla and Colin Crawford for organizing a stimulating week of lectures and
site visits in Bogoti. I am particularly grateful to the Colombian scholars,
government officials, and community leaders who shared their insights on Bogotd's
remarkable transformation and their views on the challenges ahead.
1. See

HERNANDO DE SoTo, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS

IN THE WEST AND

FAILS

EVERYWHERE ELSE

5-7, 75 (2000);

HERNANDO DE SoTo, THE

OTHER PATH: THE ECONOMIC ANSWER TO TERRORISM 55-57 (1989); WORLD BANK,
HOUSING: ENABLING MARKETS TO WORK 117 (1993); Alan Gilbert, On the Mystery of
Capital and the Myths of Hernando de Soto, 24 INT'L DEV. PLAN. REV. 1, 4 (2002).
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erty and housing scarcity if the urban poor are simply given legal
title to the lands they currently occupy informally.
II.

POVERTY AND INFORMALITY IN A MODEL CITY

During the last fifteen years Bogotd, Colombia, has been
transformed from a city in crisis to a paradigm of good urban governance. 2 A series of highly competent mayors increased the city
government's income; invested in parks, public transit and new
libraries; improved access to electricity, water and sanitation; and
restored a sense of civic pride. 3 Like the Brazilian cities of Curitiba and Porto Alegre, Bogotd is widely regarded as a model city
whose practices are worthy of emulation.4
However, among the challenges that Bogota continues to face
are high levels of poverty5 and an acute housing deficit. Of the
city's more than seven million inhabitants, at least two-fifths live
below the poverty line.7 Many of these residents occupy substandard housing in the inner city or in the urban periphery.' Approximately one million bogotanos reside in Ciudad Bolivar, a
sprawling slum at the southern end of Bogotd consisting primarily
of self-constructed dwellings.'
Ciudad Bolivar is an example of an informal settlement.' ° For
purposes of this article, an informal settlement is a settlement
that operates outside the framework of government regulation.
Informal settlements are common in every city in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America 1 and are becoming increasingly visible in the
2. See Alan Gilbert, Good Urban Governance: Evidence from a Model City?, 25
OF LATIN AM. RES. 392, 393-94 (2006).
3. See id. at 394-98.
4. See id. at 394.
5. See id. at 410.
6. See UN HABITAT, GLOBAL REPORT ON HUMAN SETTLEMENTS 2003: THE
CHALLENGE OF SLUMS 205 (2003), available at http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/get
Page.asp?page=BookView&book=1156; Alexander Nifio Ruiz, Formal and Informal
Housing Practices in Bogotd, Colombia: The Experience of Metrovivienda and Juan
XXII, 36 UNIVERSIDAD DE Los ANDES, REVISTA DE DERECHO PRIVADO 177, 188 (2006).
7. Gilbert, supra note 2, at 393, 399.
8. See UN HABITAT, supra note 6, at 205.
BULL.

9. RAOL

ZIBECHI,

CENTER

FOR

INTERNATIONAL

POLICY,

AMERICAS

SPECIAL REPORT: WHERE THE ASPHALT ENDS: BOGOTA'S PERIFERIES

11, 2008), available at http://americas.irc-online.org/am/5057.
10. Nicolds Rueda-Garcia, The Case of Bogotd D.C., Colombia, in
SLUMS: CASE STUDIES FOR THE GLOBAL REPORT ON

HUMAN

PROGRAM

paras. 1, 3 (Mar.
UNDERSTANDING

SETTLEMENTS

8, available

at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/Global Report/cities/bogota.htm.
11. See GEORGES VERNEZ, PIRATE SETTLEMENTS, HOUSING CONSTRUCTION
INCREMENTAL DEVELOPMENT
COLOMBIA 2 (1973).

AND

Low

INCOME

HOUSING

POLICIES IN

BY
BOGOTA,

2009] SQUATTERS, PIRATES, & ENTREPRENEURS

241

United States. 12 Whereas the informal settlements in most Latin
American cities result from the illegal invasion of public or private
land ("squatting"), most of BogotA's informal settlements are socalled "pirate" settlements involving the purchase of land by settler families from a proprietor or developer. 13 While the land
purchase is usually legal, the subdivision typically fails to comply
with applicable requirements regarding zoning, permits and
licenses, and access to urban services (such as water, electricity,
paved roads, drainage, and sewers). 4 The land often consists of
former agricultural lands far from the urban center or low-lying
lands with flooding problems. 5 The purchaser will usually occupy
the land despite the absence of urban services in violation of the
municipal housing code, 6 and will gradually construct a dwelling
and negotiate with the municipality for the provision of these services. 7 The dwelling itself may also fail to comply with the local
building codes.' 8
Informal housing is a product of poverty and rapid urbanization. The post-World War II flood of migrants from the rural areas
to the urban centers of the global South has been described as one
of the great migrations of human history. 9 In Colombia, the
industrialization of agriculture along with high levels of political
violence produced a massive rural-to-urban shift during the span
of a few decades.2" In 1950, only 32.7% of Colombia's population
was urban. 2'

By 1970 the urban population had climbed to

12. See Jane E. Larson, Informality, Illegality, and Inequality, 20 YALE L. &
REV. 137, 141-42 (2002).

POL'Y

13. See VERNEz, supra note 11.
14. See

RAKESH

MOHAN,

UNDERSTANDING

THE DEVELOPING METROPOLIS: LESSONS

FROM THE CITY STUDY OF BOGOTA AND CALI, COLOMBIA

154-55 (1994).

15. Umberto Molina, Bogotd: Competition and Substitution Between Urban Land
Markets, in THE

TRANSFORMATION OF LAND SUPPLY SYSTEMS IN THIRD WORLD CITIES

295, 298 (Paul Baross & Jan van der Linden eds., 1990).
16. See VERNEz, supra note 11, at 3.
17. See Molina, supra note 15, at 299.
18. See VERNEZ, supra note 11, at 3.
19. William A. Doebele, The Private Market & Low Income Urbanization: The
"Pirate"Subdivisions of Bogotd, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 531, 532 (1977).
20. See John Betancur, Spontaneous Settlements in Colombia: From Opposition to
Reluctant Acceptance to... Again Opposition, in HOUSING THE URBAN POOR: POLICY &
PRACTICE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 224 (Brian C. Aldrich & Ranvinder S. Sandhu
eds., 1995).
21. UNITED NATIONS, WORLD URBANIZATION PROSPECTS: THE 2007 REVISION 80
tbl.A.2 (2007), available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wup2007/
4
2007WUPHighlightsweb.pdf.
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54.8%.22 In 2007, the figure stood at 74.2%.23 Because many
migrants lacked meaningful job opportunities in the cities, they
frequently resorted to self-help housing and self-employment to
provide for basic needs.2 4 In 1970, nearly half of the families in
Bogotd lived in pirate settlements.2 5 As migration from the countryside continues, informal settlements in Bogotd and other urban
centers are anticipated to proliferate.2 6
The initial response to informal housing in much of the global
South was slum clearance-the mass eviction of poor households.27 When this approach merely shifted the problem to the
urban periphery, the dominant approach became upgrading and
legalization. 21 In Bogota, the legalization process involved the provision of public services (such as roads, water, electricity, drainage
and sewage) to pirate subdivisions based on contributions from
the government, from the developers, and from the community
2 9 Once the subdivision was legalized, individual lot owners
itself.
could initiate proceedings to obtain legal title to the land they
occupied. 0 In order to facilitate this process, the government
waived a series of requirements, including deeds, income tax
returns, proof of military service, payment of national taxes, and
possession of construction or urbanization licenses. 1
Designed to encourage private home ownership, Bogota's land
titling program is consistent with the housing programs adopted
in most of the global South 32 and consistent with the evolving policy debates about poverty and informality.
III.

FROM DEMOLITION TO LEGALIZATION: THE EVOLUTION
OF HOUSING POLICY IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

The issue of informal housing in the developing world became
the subject of serious inquiry beginning in the 1960s.3 At first,
the policy debate was dominated by scholars such as anthropolo22. Id.
23. Id. at 72 tbl.A1.
24. See Betancur, supra note 20, at 224-26.
25. VERNEZ, supra note 11, at 6.
26. UN HABITAT, supra note 6, at 205.
27. Id. at 125, 127.
28. Id. at 127.
29. MOHAN, supra note 14, at 154.
30. Id. at 155.
31. See Law of Urban Reform (Law 9 of 1989), arts. 44-46, available at http:/!
planeacion.cali.gov.co/pot/normas/ley9.html; Betancur, supra note 20, at 233.
32. See MoHAN, supra note 14, at 180.

33. See Charles L. Choguill, The Future of Planned Urban Development in the
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gist Oscar Lewis, who attributed the plight of the urban underclass to the "culture of poverty" - pathological cultural traits such
as dependence, fatalism, lack of ambition, criminality, and inability to adapt to modern urban norms. 4 Consistent with this thesis,
the poor were blamed for their own failure to enter the formal
housing and job markets, and governments were encouraged to
allocate resources to industry and transportation rather than
squander them on low-income housing.35 Negative stereotypes
about the urban poor were used to justify eviction and demolition
as the initial policy response to informal settlements. 6
By the late 1960s, housing policy was in transition as a consequence of the work of scholars such as William Mangin and John
Turner. 7 Mangin argued that informal housing, far from being
evidence of social pathology, was a rational response to the complex problem of rapid urbanization, migration, and housing
shortages.3 Turner contended that giving the poor security of
land tenure would result in the progressive upgrading of informal
urban settlements through individual and community self-help. 9
Turner and Mangin's ideas were particularly appealing to policymakers in the global South because they offered resourcestrapped governments inexpensive solutions to the crisis of urban
housing.4"
Following decades of land tenure reform experiments
throughout the developing world, the debate about formalization
of property rights has been revived by the work of Hernando de
Third World: New Directions, in HOUSING THE URBAN POOR: POLICY & PRACTICE IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 404 (Brian C. Aldrich & Ranvinder S. Sandhu eds., 1995).
34. See id.; Asef Bayat, Globalization and the Politics of Informals in the Global
South, in URBAN INFORMALITY: TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES FROM THE MIDDLE EAST,
83 (Ananya Roy & Nezar Alsayyad, eds., 2004). See
LATIN AMERICA, AND SouTH As
generally OSCAR LEWIS, LA VIDA: A PUERTO RICAN FAMILY IN THE CULTURE OF
POVERTY (1966); OSCAR LEWIS, CHILDREN OF SANCHEZ: AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A MEXICAN
FAMILY (1961); OSCAR LEWIS, FIVE FAMILIES: MEXICAN CASE STUDIES IN THE CULTURE
OF POVERTY (1959).

35. See Choguill, supra note 33.
36. See Janice E. Perlman, Marginality: From Myth to Reality in the Favelas of
Rio de Janeiro, 1969-2002, in URBAN INFORMALITY: TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, LATIN AMERICA, AND SouTH ASIA 120 (Ananya Roy & Nezar
Alsayyad, eds. 2004).

37. See Choguill, supra note 33.
38. See William Mangin, Latin American Squatter Settlements: A Problem and a
Solution, 2 LATIN AM. RES. REV.65, 85 (1967).
39. See, e.g., JoHN F.C. TURNER, HOUSING BY PEOPLE: TOWARDS AUTONOMY IN
BUILDING ENVIRONMENTS (1976); John F.C. Turner, Barriers and Channels for
Housing Development in Modernizing Countries, 33 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 167 (1967).
40. See Choguill, supra note 33, at 405.
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Soto. De Soto argues that the poor in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America are actually the owners of vast assets, most notably selfconstructed dwellings. 41 According to de Soto, the poor have failed
to benefit from capitalism because their assets are not recognized
by the formal legal system; thus, these assets are not readily convertible into capital, cannot be traded beyond a narrow circle of
trustworthy acquaintances, and cannot be used as collateral for
business and home improvement loans.42
Rather than blaming the poor for their misfortune, de Soto
depicts the urban poor as hard-working, creative, and
entrepreneurial, 43 attributing their disenfranchisement to the
elite's manipulation of the legal system to create formidable
administrative obstacles to the receipt of permits and licenses for
the establishment of new businesses and for housing construction.44 De Soto's prescription for reform consists of de-regulation,
de-bureaucratization, and privatization so as to unleash the
entrepreneurial energies of the poor.45 What is required is not the
abolition of informality but the integration of extralegal arrangements into the formal legal system.46
In short, de Soto attributes the persistence of poverty in
developing and former socialist countries to the failure of these
nations' legal systems.47 Using the United States as an example,
de Soto contends that the economic prosperity of "advanced
nations" is due to their successful formalization of extralegal
assets into one unified property law
system, and recommends that
48
developing countries follow suit.
De Soto's ideas have been warmly received across the ideological spectrum. 49 For the left, de Soto's pro-poor rhetoric is a welcome antidote to cultural explanations of poverty that depict the
poor as shiftless and lazy. 0 For the right, the notion of poverty
41. See

DE SOTO,

THE

MYSTERY OF CAPITAL,

supra note 1, at 5, 32-35 (concluding

that the value of the assets held by the poor in developing and former communist
countries is at least $9.3 trillion).
42. See id. at 6.
43. See id. at 28-30.
44. See

DE SoTo, THE OTHER PATH,

supra note 1, at 208-10.

45. See id. at 242-52.
46. See id. at 252.
47. See id. at 12, 134-42, 184-87, 233-34;

DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL,

supra

note 1, at 4-10, 46-62, 161-71.
48. See generally

DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL,

supra note 1, at 105-51.

49. See Celestine Nyamu Musembi, De Soto and Land Relations in Rural Africa:
Breathing Life into Dead Theories about Property Rights, 28 THIRD WORLD Q. 1457,
1458 (2007).
50. See, e.g., Gerald Torres, The New Property, 56 STAN. L. REV. 741, 745 (2003).
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alleviation through self-help is consistent with the neoliberal
notion of limiting the role of the state to the establishment of legal
and institutional framework necessary to facilitate the operation
of the market.5 '
IV.

DEMYSTIFYING DE SoTo: THE ADVANTAGES AND

DISADVANTAGES OF FORMAL TITLE

In The Mystery of Capital and The Other Path, de Soto makes
three principal arguments regarding the benefits of formal title.
Drawing upon studies of titling programs in Bogotd and other
Latin American cities, I will examine each of these arguments in
turn and then will discuss some of the potential pitfalls of de
Soto's recommended approach.
First, de Soto argues that lack of formal title and the everpresent threat of eviction cause informal settlers to under-invest
in their dwellings, foregoing such items as piping, drainage, roofing, and sanitation. 2 While this argument may be intuitively
appealing, empirical studies indicate that tenure security rather
than formal title is critical with respect to investment.53 Most
urban residents assess the security and legitimacy of their property rights based on indications of government tolerance, particularly the provision of infrastructure or the collection of property
taxes, and based on community recognition of their property-owning status. 4 In the pirate settlements of Bogotdi, for example, settlers were willing to commence home construction despite the
absence of formal title as soon as they obtained receipts for plots of
land and especially once water and electricity became available.55
Indeed, residents of Ciudad Bolivar's Jerusal6n neighborhood
developed their own informal legal norms to prove ownership and
to prevent invasion of plots by outsiders, including the use of nota56
rized promissory notes and the development of a register of plots.
Second, de Soto contends that informality impedes the poor's
access to financing for home improvement or to start a new business because lenders will not accept informal property as collat51. See Musembi, supra note 49.
52. See DE SoTo, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 1, at 161.
53. See Gilbert, supra note 1, at 7-8.
54. Musembi, supra note 49, at 1461; Ann Varley, Private or Public: Debating the
Meaning of Land Tenure Legalization, 26 INT'L J. URB. & REGIONAL REs. 449, 455

(2002).
55. See Doebele, supra note 19, at 537; Gilbert, supra note 1, at 8.
56. See Daniel Bonilla, Legal Pluralism and Extra-Legal Property: Class, Culture
and Law in BogotA 29-31 (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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eral for loans. 51 Evidence from Bogotd and from studies conducted
in countries as varied as Turkey, Mexico, Argentina, South Africa
and de Soto's native Peru conclude that formal title makes little
difference with respect to the acquisition of loans from private sector lenders." Financial institutions are reluctant to lend to the
poor because their incomes are low; because self-employment
income (even if adequate) is difficult to verify; because lenders
view low-income borrowers as unreliable; and because potential
borrowers' homes are often constructed in hazard-prone areas
(such as steep hillsides or floodplains).5 9
Furthermore, many poor families hesitate to take out mortgage loans because they distrust formal financial institutions and
are unwilling to risk losing their homes in the event of non-payment. ° Many prefer the flexibility of unsecured credit based on
informal arrangements with friends or relatives." The ongoing
mortgage debacle in the United States certainly justifies a cautious approach and underscores the danger of formalizing property rights without implementing regulatory measures to protect
the poor from predatory lending.2
Third, de Soto argues that informality impedes the development of robust property markets by imposing cumbersome
approval procedures, often involving all of the neighbors in order
to transfer property.63 De Soto's claim is contradicted by the
development of active markets for untitled land in Bogotd and
elsewhere in the developing world.6 Furthermore, to the extent
that the market at issue is for existing dwellings, studies of
Bogota, Santiago de Chile, Caracas, and Mexico City suggest that
formal title appears to make little difference because the market
for dwellings in low-income neighborhoods tends to be sluggish on
the demand side due to potential buyers' limited income and lim57. See DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 1, at 162.
58. See Gilbert, supra note 1, at 11; Development: Of Property and Poverty,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 26, 2006, at 50; Julio Calder6n Cockburn, Property and Credit:
Property Formalizationin Peru 19-20, 44 (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Working
Paper, 2002).
59. See Gilbert, supra note 1, at 11-12.
60. See Cockburn, supra note 58, at 38-39; Gilbert, supra note 1, at 13.
61. See Varley, supra note 54, at 455.
62. See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj, Housing Lenders Fear Bigger Wave of Loan Defaults,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/04/
business/O4lend.html?r=2&oref=slogin&oref= slogin (describing the ongoing
mortgage crisis in the United States).
63. See DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 1, at 47.
64. See Gilbert, supra note 1, at 9.
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ited ability to obtain formal financing. 5 On the supply side, lowincome home owners who have acquired legal title may be reluctant to sell their homes due to the many years of sweat equity
invested in their dwellings, the value of the social networks they
have established, and their inability to afford a better home in a
more desirable location.6 In addition, dwellings in low-income
formalized settlements may not be suitable for commodification
because these dwellings represent far more than shelter or economic assets; they are often central to the life stories of the urban
poor and to the life stories of their families and their
communities. 67
In short, contrary to de Soto's assertions, the mere provision
of legal title is unlikely to improve investment in urban housing,
create a vibrant market for low-income dwellings, or provide the
urban poor with capital to finance entrepreneurial activities. In
addition to overestimating the advantages of formal title, de Soto
fails to address some of the disadvantages of regularization and
titling programs.
First, regularization and titling programs may subject the
urban poor to property taxes and utility bills that they can ill
afford. In Bogota, social stratification is the tool used to assess
property taxes and utility charges. 8 Neighborhoods are classified
into six different strata according to social and economic characteristics.6 9 Neighborhoods classified as strata one and two pay the
lowest taxes and are entitled to greater social services. 0 If the
formalization process results in an upgrade in the neighborhood's
stratification, the community will be subjected to higher levels of
taxation and fewer social services.71
Second, regularization and titling programs may increase the
vulnerability of the urban poor to predatory lending if these programs facilitate the use of homes for personal and business loans.
In the United States for example, predatory lenders encouraged
65. See id. at 10-11; Alan Gilbert, Financing Self-Help Housing: Evidence from
Bogotd, Colombia, 5 INT'L PLAN. STUD. 165, 178-79 (2000) (explaining why financial
institutions are reluctant to finance the purchase of existing self-constructed housing
with or without legal title).
66. See Cockburn, supra note 58, at 35; Varley, supra note 54, at 457.
67. See Varley, supra note 66.
68. See Rueda-Garcia, supra note 10, at 12.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See Bonilla, supra note 56, at 30-31 (quoting a Jerusalkn community leader's
acknowledgement that regularization and titling may result in upward
reclassification of the community's stratification).
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low-income home owners to take out loans on disadvantageous
terms on the theory that they could later refinance based on
appreciating housing prices; when the housing bubble burst,
many borrowers defaulted on their loans and lost their homes,
triggering a world-wide financial crisis.7 2 The recent U.S. experience highlights the risks of predatory lending and the importance
of government oversight of lending practices to prevent abuse.
Third, formalization may impair the social capital of the
urban poor by undermining the social solidarity and community
organizing that enabled informal settlements to develop and
thrive in the first place. For example, in the early 1980s, the
8,000 residents of the Jerusal~n neighborhood of Ciudad Bolivar
did not have electricity, water, drainage, sewers, telephones, public transit or schools. 73 Through collective efforts the residents
developed day care and community education projects; constructed roads, parks, clinics and shops; and organized a neighborhood strike in order to pressure the municipal government to
provide basic infrastructure and services.7 ' As a consequence of
over twenty years of community organizing, Jerusal6n became one
of the few informal settlements in Bogota to have a full panoply of
urban services, including water, electricity, schools, public transit,
and parks.7 5 Regrettably, regularization and titling programs
may undermine community solidarity by promoting individualistic solutions to economic and social problems. Indeed, based on
their work on the impact of self-help housing in Mexico City, Alan
Gilbert and Ann Varley conclude that home ownership discourages political protest and re-orients the energy of the household to
individual home improvement. 6
Fourth, the urban infrastructure and self-constructed dwellings in informal settlements may be substandard and unacceptable for human habitation.7 Formalization may reinforce the
inferior social status of the urban poor by giving legal imprimatur
to double standards for health, safety and environmental qual72. See Joseph Stiglitz, Houses of Cards, GUARDIAN, Oct. 9, 2007, available at
http://www/guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/Oct/09/housesofcards.
73. ZIBECHI, supra note 9, at para. 7.
74. See id. at paras. 10-20; Bonilla, supra note 56, at 15-19.
75. ZIBECHI, supra note 9, at para. 5.
76. ALAN GILBERT & ANN
URBAN MEXICO 11 (1991).

VARLEY, LANDLORD AND TENANT: HOUSING THE POOR IN

77. Martim 0. Smolka, Informality, Urban Poverty and Land Market Prices, 15
LINES (2003), available at http-//www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/PubDetail.aspx?
pubid=723.
LAND
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ity.7 8 One solution to this problem is to require the progressive

upgrading of dwellings and infrastructure in legalized settlements
and to provide government credit, subsidies and technical assistance for this purpose. For example, the upgrading of low-income
housing is one of the explicit objectives of Bogota's regularization
and titling program.7 9 Furthermore, it is important to recognize
that formal settlements do not necessarily adhere in practice to
higher health, safety and environmental standards than informal
settlements. Paradoxically, the collective efforts of informal settlers have often produced superior urban planning in informal settlements than government or private development of comparable
middle-class or low-income formal settlements. ° Thus, the actual
impact of formalization on health, safety and environmental quality will have to be assessed on a case by case basis.
Fifth, regularization and titling programs are problematic to
the extent that they are not accompanied by other policies to
increase the urban housing stock. While formalization (ideally)
upgrades the quality of the existing housing stock, it does not generate new housing.81 In addition, the cost of providing water, sewers, and other municipal services to informal settlements is often
higher than the cost of servicing new land and making it available
for development.82 In Bogotd for example, many informal settlements are located in areas that are difficult or costly to reach, or
in areas vulnerable to natural disasters. 3 In order to increase the
formal housing stock and to compete with pirate developers,
Bogota's housing policy includes working with landowners and
private developers to produce formal housing for low-income
8
home-buyers4.
However, this policy is unlikely to succeed unless
low-cost loans or subsidies are made available to poor families.8 5
Pirate developers offer low-income borrowers de facto credit in the
form of installment sales for the purchase of land with no forms to
78. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Twelfth Chronicle: The Problem of the Shanty,
85 GEO. L.J. 667, 675 (1997); Larson, supra note 12, at 160-64.
79. See Ruiz, supra note 6, at 192-93.
80. See Jorge L. Esquirol, Titling and Untitled Housing in PanamaCity, 4 TENN.
J. LAw & POL'Y 243, 281-82 (forthcoming 2008) [hereinafter Esquirol, Titling and
Untitled Housing]; Alvaro Uribe, Ciudad y Sostenibilidad, Remarks at Encuentro
Interamericano de Desarrollo Sostenible, Fundaci6n Conama (Nov. 19-21, 2007)
(transcript available at http://www.conama.orgleima/documentos/8.pdf).
81. Ruiz, supra note 6, at 203.
82. See Smolka, supra note 77.
83. Ruiz, supra note 6, at 197.
84. See id. at 198.
85. See id. at 200.
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fill out and no questions asked, and with the right of immediate
occupancy once the down payment is made. 6 Furthermore, informality enables poor families to make incremental investments in
servicing and construction over a span of several years using both
sweat equity (family labor) and cash. 7 Contrary to the free market
policy prescriptions of de Soto, state intervention is required in
order to provide low-income urban dwellers with the necessary
financial assistance to purchase land in the formal sector.
Sixth, formalization programs are problematic to the extent
that they are not accompanied by efforts to increase the stock of
affordable rental housing. Since the 1950s, governments in Latin
America have promoted owner-occupied housing because it is perceived as a stabilizing force that gives poor urban dwellers a stake
in the urban social order. 88 However, in the context of everincreasing urban sprawl, rental housing offers the convenience of
central location and greater mobility. 9 As BogotA's population
continues to grow and as urban lands become scarcer and more
distant from the city center, creating affordable rental housing
needs to be an important element of Bogota's housing policy.9"
Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of formal versus
informal housing will vary from location to location.9 1 In some cities in Latin America, titling programs have produced gentrification and housing instability as newly titled lands are sought by
real estate speculators and developers in order to construct luxury
housing. 92 In Bogota, this phenomenon has not yet materialized. 93
While a full assessment of the costs and benefits of formality and
informality is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to
acknowledge that such an assessment must be grounded in local
knowledge and local conditions.
86. Doebele, supra note 19, at 549.
87. See Paul Baross, Sequencing Land Development: The Price Implications of
Legal and Illegal Settlement Growth, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAND SUPPLY
SYSTEMS IN THIRD WORLD CITIES

57, 64-65 (Paul Baross & Jan van der Linden eds.,

1990).
88. ALAN GILBERT, IN SEARCH OF A HOME: RENTAL AND SHARED HOUSING IN LATIN
AMERICA 1 (1993).

89. Id. at 156.
90. See Ruiz, supra note 6, at 204.
91. See generally Steven E. Hendrix, Myths of Property Rights, 12 ARIZ. J. INTL &
COMP. L. 183 (1995) (arguing that the impact of land titling varies depending on a
multiplicity of local factors, including custom, geography, law, and history); Esquirol,
Titling and Untitled Housing, supra note 80 (analyzing the advantages and
disadvantages of formal and informal title in Panama City, Panama).
92. Esquirol, Titling and Untitled Housing, supra note 80, at 292.
93. See Gilbert, supra note 1, at 15.
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In sum, de Soto's claims about the benefits of formal property
are not supported by studies of land titling programs in Latin
America and elsewhere in the developing world. Far from being a
panacea, regularization and titling programs possess advantages
and disadvantages which must be evaluated on a case by case
basis. What matters in the end is making sure that the urban
poor have adequate shelter, decent jobs, and access to health care
and education. Whether the best solution is formality or informality will depend upon local circumstances.
V.

DECONSTRUCTING THE "FAILED LAW" HYPOTHESIS

One of the central premises of de Soto's work is that the disenfranchisement of the urban poor is due to the failure of law in
the global South,94 and that the solution lies in the familiar onesize-fits-all prescriptions of neoliberalism: privatization, deregulation, and de-bureaucratization. 95 De Soto's claims are problematic
for the three distinct reasons discussed below.
A.

Informality in the Global North

De Soto's "failure of law" hypothesis neglects to account for
informality in the global North, and thereby perpetuates the myth
of informality as a phenomenon of legal and economic
"underdevelopment." In the state of Texas for example, over
400,000 people reside in informal settlements known as colonias.96
The colonias are widely distributed throughout the state (rather
than confined to the border) and are populated by whites and African-Americans as well as Mexican-Americans. 97 The residents of
the colonias are typically the working poor who purchase unserviced land on an installment basis and then construct their own
dwellings or purchase trailer-type dwellings or portable homes.9"
The colonias are appearing on the periphery of the urban landscape because they offer affordable housing to low-income households in cities with relatively high housing costs.99 Peter Ward
94. See DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 1, at 5-10, 46-62, 161-71; DE
SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 1, at 12, 134-42, 184-87, 233-34.
95. See DE SoTo, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 1, at 242-52.
96. Larson, supra note 12, at 141-42.
97. Peter Ward, Informality of Housing Productionat the Urban-Rural Interface:
The "Not So Strange Case" of the Texas Colonias, in URBAN INFORMALITY:
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, LATIN AMERICA, AND SOUTH

ASIA 243, 265 (Ananya Roy & Nezar Alsayyad, eds., 2004).

98. Id. at 247-49, 252-54.
99. Id. at 250-51.
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describes the colonias as a rational response by the working poor
to a statewide shortage of affordable housing in a regional economy characterized by vast inequality between high-income professional and industrial workers and low-paid service sector
employees. 100 Colonias can also be found in Arizona, New Mexico,
and California.'
Moreover, informality in the global North is not limited to the
housing sector. In the United States, a wide variety of economic
actors operate outside of or in violation of government regulations,
including unlicensed street vendors,1 02 gypsy cabs,'03 garment
industry sweatshops, TM and house- and office-cleaning services. 0 5
Saskia Sassen argues that informality in the global North is a
function of economic polarization reflected in "the decline of the
middle class, the growth of a high-income professional class, and
the expansion of the low-income population." 0 6 Jane Larson
predicts that low-income households in the United States will
increasingly resort to informal economic activity, including informal housing and working "under the table," to the extent that economic globalization continue to depress wages and to discourage
government investment in affordable housing and in social welfare programs.0 7
In other words, informality is not an exotic transplant from
Latin America or a manifestation of legal "underdevelopment."
Rather, informality is a rational response to poverty and inequality, and will likely flourish in both the North and the South as
long as the underlying economic causes persist.
B.

The Neoliberal Prescription:Exacerbating
Inequality and Informality

De Soto's proposed reforms exacerbate the housing crisis by
100. Id. at 247-50.
101. Texas Secretary of State, Colonias FAQ's, http://www.sos.state.tx.us/border
colonias/faqs.shtml (last visited Oct. 22, 2008).
102. Regina Austin, "An Honest Living:" Street Vendors, MunicipalRegulation, and
the Black Public Sphere, 103 YALE L.J. 2119, 2120 (1994).
103. Saskia Sassen, The Informal Economy, in DUAL CITY: RESTRUCTURING NEW

YORK 79, 101 n.52 (John Hull Mollenkopf & Manuel Castells eds., 1991).
104. See Alex Stepick, Miami's Two Informal Sectors, in THE INFORMAL ECONOMY:
STUDIES IN ADVANCED AND LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 111, 116 (Alejandro Portes et
al. eds., 1989).
105. Larson, supra note 12, at 152-53.
106. Saskia Sassen, The Informal Economy: Between New Developments and Old
Regulations, 103 YALE L.J. 2289, 2303 (1994).
107. Larson, supra note 12, at 142, 153-54.
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increasing poverty and inequality in Latin America and throughout the global South. Latin America is no stranger to economic
inequality. As the World Bank acknowledges, the "empirical literature unambiguously suggests that Latin America is the region
with the highest levels of inequality in the world, and that this
has been true for as long as the statistics have been kept." 08s For

example, according to the United Nations Development Program,
64% of Colombia's population lives below the poverty line. °9 The
informal sector accounts for 58% of the country's non-agricultural
employment. 110 The country's Gini index, which measures inequality (with 0 representing absolute equality and 100 representing absolute inequality) is 58.6, giving Colombia the dubious
distinction of surpassing Brazil's notoriously high levels of
inequality."'
While inequality has a long history in Latin America, the
United Nations Settlements Program concluded in a major report
on the world's slums that the single greatest cause of increasing
poverty and inequality in the last two decades was the retreat of
the state from the economy under the auspices of neoliberal economic reforms, including reduced social welfare spending, privatization of state enterprises, reduced regulation of labor markets,
and curtailment of the state's role in the provision of public housing."' In most Latin American countries, these reforms were
undertaken pursuant to structural adjustment programs mandated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank
and the Inter-American Development Bank in response to the
region's debt crisis."' The neoliberal economic reforms exacerbated inequality, increased unemployment, and swelled the ranks
of the informal sector." 4 As a consequence of these reforms, there
108. WORLD

BANK, INEQUALITY IN LATIN AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN: BREAKING WITH

2-27 (2003), available at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/LAC/LAC.nsf/
ECADocByUnid/4112F1114F594B4B85256DB3005DB262?Opendocument.
109. See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME,
HuMAN
RIGHTS
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008 238 tbl.3 (2007), availableat http://hdr.undp.org/en/
reports/global/hdr2007-2008.
110. See id. at 299 tbl.21.
111. See id. at 282 tbl.15. By way of comparison, the Gini index of Brazil is 57.0
and that of Argentina is 51.3. Id. at 281-82 tbl.15.
112. See UN HABITAT, supra note 6, at 43-45.
HISTORY?

113. See DUNcAN

GREEN, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE RISE AND CRISIS OF MARKET

39, 47-49 tbl.2.1 (2d ed. 2003).
114. See id. at 153-59. The impact of neoliberal economic reforms on informal
housing (as opposed to informality generally) is more difficult to assess because these
reforms have been accompanied by regularization and titling programs designed to
formalize the informal sector. See, e.g., Alan Gilbert, Love in the Time of Enhanced
ECONOMICS IN LATIN AMERICA
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was a significant increase in inequality within countries, between
countries, and in the world as a whole between 1973 and 1993.115
De Soto's work re-packages and re-popularizes discredited
neoliberal economic policies in pseudo-populist garb. Far from
being a cure to the economic ills of the global South, de Soto's "free
market" prescriptions threaten to aggravate the disease.
C. Reinforcing the Stereotype of Latin American
Inferiority
De Soto's "failed law" hypothesis threatens to reinforce stereotypes of Latin American "inferiority" and legal "underdevelopment." Just as the "culture of poverty" discourse pathologized the
urban poor and justified the demolition of informal settlements,
the "failure of law" has been used as a discursive device for the
past half century to justify a wide variety of legal reform projects
in Latin America.116 Even though the objectives of the reform
projects changed over time, the image of Latin American dysfunctionality endured. 117 Latin American legal institutions were constructed as inflexible, inefficient, obsolete and corrupt."8
The "failed law" discourse renders Latin American legal systems vulnerable to legal reform projects that may ultimately disserve the interests of Latin American nations. In the 1980s and
1990s for example, the objective of these projects was to facilitate
neoliberal economic reforms by strengthening the role of the market." 9 Echoing de Soto, law and economics proponents identified
excessive regulation as the obstacle to economic development, and
advocated laissez-faire, market-enhancing alternatives. 2 °
Perhaps the most insidious effect of the "failure of law" discourse is that it discredits Latin America legal innovations as
inherently "inferior," and therefore not worthy of serious study by
scholars or policy-makers in the global North.'2 ' For example,
Texas law-makers initially regarded the colonias as a phenomeCapital Flows: Reflections on the Links Between Liberalization and Informality, in
URBAN INFORMALITY: TRANSNATIONAL

PERSPECTIVES FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, LATIN

AMERICA, AND SOUTH AsIA 57 (Ananya Roy & Nezar Alsayyad, eds., 2004).

115. See UN HABITAT, supra note 6, at 36, 38 box3.1.
116. See Jorge L. Esquirol, The FailedLaw of Latin America, 56 Am. J. COMP. L. 75,
76, 92-94 (2008) [hereinafter Esquirol, FailedLaw of Latin America].
117. See id. at 94.
118. See id. at 124.
119. See id. at 94-95.
120. See id. at 103-05, 110-11.
121. See id. at 113-14, 116.
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non of Mexican origin and as a haven for criminals and illegal
immigrants. 22 Accordingly, they attempted to outlaw and
criminalize such developments instead of recognizing the positive
role that the colonias might play as part of a broader strategy to
address serious economic and social inequality.'23 Efforts to persuade Texas officials that they might learn from Mexico's twentyyear history of dealing with informal housing fell on deaf ears.2 4
As Jane Larson points out, few legal scholars in the United States
study informality. 125 Informality is regarded as a Third World26
phenomenon of interest to only law and development scholars.1
However, law and development scholars tend to focus on transferring U.S. law to developing countries rather than learning from
legal experiments in the global South.'27 Sadly, de Soto's construction of informality as a failure of Latin America law only reinforces these misperceptions and deprives U.S. scholars and policymakers of valuable insights.
Two Latin American innovations hold particular promise in
terms of advancing the rights of economically marginalized communities and promoting the right to housing. The first is the
inclusion of social and economic rights in modern Latin American
constitutions. The second is the social function doctrine. Regrettably, these innovations are not widely studied by legal scholars in
the United States.
Unlike the United States, which recognizes in its Bill of
Rights only "negative rights" to be free from government interference, most Latin American nations also recognize economic, social
1 28
and cultural rights imposing affirmative duties on government.
For example, the 1991 Colombian Constitution recognizes the
right to dignified housing and imposes affirmative obligations on
the Colombian state to give effect to this right. 29 The 1991 Colombian Constitution also recognizes the right to education, 13 the
right to health care,"' the right to a healthy environment,132and a
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
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128. See
129. See

Ward, supra note 97, at 247.
id.
id.
Larson, supra note 12, at 158.
id.
id.
ANGEL R. OQUENDO, LATIN AMERICAN LAw 324 (2006).
CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA art. 51, available

presidencia.gov.co/constitucionlindex.swf.
130. See id. at art. 66.
131. See id. at art. 49.
132. See id. at art. 79.
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variety of labor rights (including the right to strike and the right
to bargain collectively).' 3 3 Far from being "dysfunctional" or "inferior," the Colombian Constitutional Court has demonstrated the
justiciability of economic and social rights by vigorously protecting
these rights in the face of the Colombian government's neoliberal
economic onslaught."'
In contrast to the neoliberal vision of absolute property rights,
most Latin American constitutions impose an affirmative duty on
landowners to use their property in ways that serve a social function. 35 For example, the 1991 Colombian Constitution recognizes
that "property is a social function that implies obligations." 3 6 The
Colombian Constitutional Court has held that the social function
doctrine obligates landowners to use land in ways that are affirmatively beneficial to the community or run the risk of expropriation. "37
' The social function doctrine can be used to justify the
expropriation of both rural and urban land for the benefit of landless or homeless populations. 13 8 Indeed, the Colombian Supreme
Court invoked both the right to housing and the social function
doctrine in a case upholding the constitutionality of the Colombian government's grant of public lands to informal settlers pursu39
ant to the government's regularization and titling program.
Sadly, the English-language literature on the social function doctrine is quite sparse notwithstanding the significant interest in
this doctrine in Europe and Latin America. 4 °

VI.

THE WAY FORWARD: LESSONS FROM BOGOTA

Regularization and titling programs are extremely popular
with Latin American governments because they offer a cheap
solution to the daunting problem of urban housing, especially
133. See id. at arts. 53-56.
134. See Maria Paula Saffon, Can Constitutional Courts be Counterhegemonic
Powers Vis-A-Vis Neoliberalism? The Case of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 5
SEATTLE J.

Soc. JUST.

533, 554-57 (2007).

135. See Thomas T. Ankersen & Thomas Ruppert, Tierra y Libertad: The Social
Function Doctrine and Land Reform in Latin America, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 69, 99
(2006).
136. See id. (citing CONSTITUCION POLTICA DE COLOMBIA art. 58).
137. See Corte Constitucional de Colombia [Supreme Constitutional Court of
Colombia] Sentencia C-389/94 VII.2, VII.3, available at http://www.secretariasenado.
gov.co/leyes/SC389_94.HTM.
138. See Esquirol, Failed Law of Latin America, supra note 116, at 121.
139. See Corte Constitucional de Colombia [Supreme Constitutional Court of
Colombia] Sentencia C-251/96, available at http://www.dadep.gov.co/archivos/
documentos/juridica/jurisprudenciaCorteConstitucional/C%20-%20251-1996.doc.
140. See Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 135, at 119-20.
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when poor households contribute to the cost of providing or
upgrading municipal services. They are also extremely popular
with low income families as the culmination of decades of collective struggle for a place to call home.
However, regularization and titling program are dangerous to
the extent that they lull law-makers into believing that the "free
market" will resolve the problem of poverty and housing scarcity if
the poor are simply given legal title to the lands they occupy.
Housing policy is only one part of a broader development strategy
designed to combat poverty and inequality. In order to be effective, regularization and titling programs must be incorporated
into a multi-pronged poverty eradication strategy that addresses
employment, transportation, health, education, food security, and
access to urban infrastructure and services, and that seeks to
increase the stock of both owner-occupied and rental housing. It is
also important to incorporate rural development into such a strategy since urban migrants are former rural dwellers. Colombia in
particular, has one of the most unequal distributions of rural
lands in all of Latin America.14 ' In addition to facing opposition
from powerful landholders, land reform efforts in Colombia have
undoubtedly been stymied by the ongoing civil war."' Because
urban migrants in Colombia are typically escaping both war and
rural poverty, economic development and poverty eradication
strategies must include land reform, rural development, and
efforts to end the ongoing civil war.
Contrary to de Soto's policy prescriptions, the solution to poverty and to the housing problem lies not in further deregulation
and privatization, but in a renewed emphasis on the state's
affirmative obligation to promote economic development and to
guarantee fundamental social and economic rights, including
employment, education, housing and health care. A growing body
of scholarship by economists Ha-Joon Chang, Alice Amsden, and
others concludes that active state intervention in the economy was
critical to the achievement of prosperity in the global North and in
certain countries in the global South.'43 However, the policy flexi141. See id. at 103.
142. See id.
143. See generally ALICE H. AMSDEN, THE RISE OF "THE REST": CHALLENGES TO THE
WEST FROM LATE-INDUSTRIALIZING ECONOMIES (2001); PAUL BAIROCH, ECONOMICS AND
WORLD HISTORY: MYTHS AND PARADoxES 44-55 (1993); HA-JOON CHANG, BAD
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bility of developing countries has been eroded by the neoliberal
economic reforms required by multilateral trade agreements or
imposed as conditions to IMF and World Bank loans. At the international level, re-inserting the state into the process of economic
development requires that developing countries work collaboratively to reclaim from international trade and financial institutions the "policy space" to promote just and equitable economic
development strategies.'"
The debate over formality versus informality is in many ways
a red herring. Far from representing a failure of formal law, informality constitutes a parallel and intersecting system of law developed by the urban poor in the face of daunting economic hardship.
Formal and informal property systems coexist and influence one
another. The promissory notes and property registry system
developed by the residents of Jerusal~n mirrored those of the formal legal order. The formal legal order adapted its requirements
to the needs of the poor by providing urban services to Jerusal~n
in response to the community's mobilization and by waiving onerous regulations that would have required residents to produce tax
returns, construction licenses, and other documents in order to
obtain formal title to the land they occupied. The legal system's
tolerance of informality is itself a form of regulation akin to
enforcement discretion.14 5 Indeed, consistent with the recommendations of Mangin and Turner, the formal legal system in Colombia relied for decades on informality as an inexpensive solution to
the housing crisis, and later shifted to a strategy of formalization
through regularization and titling programs.
The advantages and disadvantages of formal and informal
title must be evaluated on a case by case basis. What matters in
the end is guaranteeing that every member of society has adeLADDER:
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144. See generally PUTrING DEVELOPMENT FIRST: THE IMPORTANCE OF POLICY SPACE
IN THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Kevin P. Gallagher, ed.,
2005) (discussing global economic forces shrinking the 'policy space' that developing
countries can draw from in order to construct policies to raise the standards of living
of their people); Carmen G. Gonzalez, Genetically Modified Organisms and Justice:
The InternationalEnvironmentalJustice Implicationsof Biotechnology, 19 GEO. INT'L
ENvTL. L. REV. 583, 633-39 (2007) (discussing the ways in which the principle of
special and differential treatment might be utilized in the WTO to give developing
countries the necessary policy space to promote economic development).
145. See Esquirol, Titled and Untitled Housing, supra note 80, at 271-72.
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quate shelter, decent jobs, a good education, and access to health
care.
Finally, one of the most powerful lessons from Ciudad Bolfvar's Jerusal~n neighborhood is the creativity of the urban poor in
devising solutions to seemingly intractable social problems.
Rather than condemning the informal regulatory systems of the
poor as tantamount to anarchy or criminality, policy-makers
should build upon the survival strategies of the poor and should
maximize the participation of low-income communities in the
design and implementation of economic development and poverty
eradication programs.
As informal housing settlements become increasingly visible
in the global North, scholars and law-makers have much to learn
from Latin America's decades of experiments with formal and
informal title and from Latin America's innovative efforts to promote the fundamental human right to housing.

